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INTRODUCTION

The financial crisis that has afflicted America’s cities and
states for the past decade is far from over. A year ago, California
acknowledged a current deficit of almost $16 billion and the state
1
may be several multiples of this in the red overall, and Illinois
recently hinted that it may look to the federal government to help
bail out its underfunded pensions.2 Many cities are in even direr
3
4
5
condition, including Detroit, Providence, and San Diego;
6
Philadelphia may not be far behind.
Under existing U.S. law, distressed municipalities can file
for bankruptcy if their state permits this, as roughly half do. The
states themselves do not have a bankruptcy option, however, no
matter how bleak their circumstances may be. In late 2010, a
brief debate erupted as to whether Congress should erect some
kind of restructuring framework for financially distressed states.
Although several prominent politicians threw their weight
7
behind the idea, and at least one senator reportedly began
soliciting support for legislation,8 the campaign quickly fizzled.
Both Democrats and Republicans rejected the idea although for
quite different reasons.
With the demise of congressional activity, attention has
shifted to other venues. The most dramatic developments have
come in the handling of municipal distress. According to

1. Chris Megerian, Deficit Could Climb, Analyst Reports, L.A. TIMES, May 19,
2012, at AA1.
2. See, e.g., Editorial, An Illinois Pension Bailout?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2012, at
A14 (criticizing suggestion by Illinois governor that he would seek federal guarantees of
Illinois pension obligations).
3. Monica Davey, State May Oversee Detroit’s Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2012,
at A17 (noting that Detroit is “straining to manage its debts and meet its payroll”).
4. Jess Bidgood & Abby Goodnough, Mayor of Providence Seeks Urgent Steps in
City’s Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at A18 (describing Providence as “one
player in the municipal crisis gripping the state”).
5. Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Leading Way, 2 Cities Pass Pension
Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A1 (stating that San Diego has “struggled to pay for
basic services”).
6. Jon Hurdle, An Ailing School System Sees a Fraught Path to Solvency, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A10 (reporting that “deep financial problems” have led
Philadelphia to consider closing “roughly one out of six public schools”).
7. See, e.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2011, at A19; Pawlenty: Consider Letting States Have Bankruptcy, CBS MINN.
(Jan. 24, 2011, 8:44 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/01/24/pawlenty-considerletting-states-have-bankruptcy/.
8. See House GOP Leader Says No to Federal Bailout of States, BISMARCK TRIB.,
Jan. 25, 2011, at 5A (“Kate Dickens, spokesman for Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., said Kirk
believes Congress should give states the power to declare bankruptcy and avoid default
and is talking to other lawmakers about potential legislation.”).
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conventional wisdom, Chapter 9, which governs municipal
bankruptcy, might be adequate for sewer and water districts or a
very small town, but it is irrelevant for real cities and
municipalities.9 A flurry of Chapter 9 filings are now calling this
seemingly settled wisdom into question. Jefferson County,
Alabama (home of Birmingham) and Stockton and San
Bernardino, California have all filed for bankruptcy, and
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania has tried.
During this same period, several states have enacted or
amended their laws to give the state greater control over the
finances of troubled municipalities. In Michigan, sweeping
amendments to the state’s municipal distress statute now
authorize, among other things, the appointment of an emergency
manager who can terminate or restructure contracts with the
10
municipality’s employees. Emergency managers have already
been appointed for several small cities,11 and Detroit is
negotiating with the state over the handling of its longstanding
12
financial distress.
Several other recent developments that might initially seem
unrelated may also have important implications for municipal
and state distress. The first is National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court’s decision
13
upholding the 2010 healthcare legislation. Although much of the
excitement surrounding the decision has centered on the Court’s
validation of the individual mandate, which requires citizens to
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty, the Court partially
struck down a set of provisions that expand Medicaid.14 These
provisions had authorized the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to cut off some or all of the federal contribution to state
Medicaid funding if a state declines to expand access to

9. See, e.g., ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33924, MUNICIPAL
REORGANIZATION: CHAPTER 9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 1–2 (2007) (noting that the
vast majority of Chapter 9 reorganizations are by small districts); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9
of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 360–
61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 as “used by tiny municipalities under peculiar
circumstances”).
10. Michigan: Legislators Pass Law on Emergency Manager Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2012, at A24. After initially being enacted in 2011, the emergency manager
provisions were repealed by voters in 2012 but similar provisions were enacted less than
two months later.
11. Steven Yaccino, Michigan Voters Repeal a Financial Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2012, at A13.
12. See id.
13. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
14. Id.
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Medicaid.15 The Court called the threat to withhold existing funds
an impermissible coercion of the states, thus reinvigorating its
jurisprudence on federal “commandeering” of the states and
raising important questions about the limits of federal
intervention in state and municipal financial distress.16
Although the recent crisis in Europe does not directly affect
the options for addressing state and municipal distress in the
United States, it has important similarities. The European
Union’s handling of the travails of Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Italy, and recent proposals to move toward “fiscal
union” or to enact a restructuring framework, raise questions
about the internal dynamics of a federalist framework that also
are highly relevant for the U.S. situation.
In this Essay, I propose to take stock of each of these
developments, focusing in particular on the lessons they offer
about the role of formal restructuring rules in a federal system. I
begin, in Part I, by asking why not put a state bankruptcy
framework in place and using this question to briefly respond to
17
a handful of the most cogent objections to state bankruptcy.
Part II examines the recent municipal filings and Michigan’s
expansion of its municipal control provisions, arguing that these
developments have significantly expanded the choice set for
dealing with municipal distress. Although underfunded pensions
are a major reason for many states’ financial distress, Part III
argues that Congress cannot realistically intervene in that
context without intervening more broadly. Part IV considers the
possibility that the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Federation of Independent Business has increased the likelihood
that a state bankruptcy law would be found to interfere with
state sovereignty. Part V explores the implications of the crisis in
Europe.
II. WHY NOT A BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK FOR STATES?
Two years after the debate first flared, the question whether
Congress should enact a bankruptcy law for states is no longer
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2602, 2606–08.
17. Because I have argued for state bankruptcy in considerable detail elsewhere,
see David A. Skeel, Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL
CRISIS 191 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 697–99 (2012) [hereinafter Skeel, States of
Bankruptcy], I focus in this Essay on concerns that others have raised about the proposal
and the implications of a series of key recent developments. The basic case is set forth in
the earlier articles.
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novel. Most observers know that cities can file for bankruptcy
and some know that bankruptcy is sometimes suggested as a
solution to the financial distress of countries such as Argentina
or Greece.18 This same period has seen the enactment of a vast
new resolution framework for global financial institutions like
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase that are themselves nearly as
19
large as some sovereign economies.
Against this backdrop, it seems appropriate to reverse the
usual question. Rather than asking why (or whether) Congress
should use its bankruptcy powers to put a resolution framework
in place for states, I propose to start with the opposite question:
why not enact a state bankruptcy framework? In answering five
of the key responses, I attempt not only to address some of the
strongest critiques of the state bankruptcy proposal, but also to
begin sketching out a few basic principles for thinking about
when formal resolution rules are or are not likely to be desirable
for addressing the financial distress of sovereign and quasisovereign entities.
A. Bond Contagion
“By all accounts,” according to a widely circulated defense of
the status quo, “the most troubling aspect of the conversation
surrounding state bankruptcy legislation has been its potential
to disrupt the municipal bond market.”20 The executive director of
the National Governors Association insisted to the Senate
Budget Committee that “no governor or state is requesting this
[bankruptcy] authority” and warned that the enactment of
bankruptcy legislation would “likely increase interest rates, raise
the cost of state government and create more volatility in
financial markets.”21 An Illinois legislator warned that a state

18. In 2002, during the most recent financial crisis in Argentina, Anne Krueger, the
First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, called for a formal
sovereign restructuring framework that became known as the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism. Anne Krueger, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Speech Before Institute for International
Economics at the Conference on “Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards” (Apr. 1,
2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm; see also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 95, 100 (2012).
19. Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act authorizes bank regulators to intervene and
restructure financial institutions that fall into financial distress if their default could
cause systemic damage. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv), 5383(b) (Supp. V 2006).
20. Barrie Tabin Berger, Telling the Truth About State and Local Finance, GOV.
FIN. REV., Apr. 2011, at 79, 80.
21. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting testimony of Raymond Scheppach) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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bankruptcy would “so roil financial markets that it would be very
destructive to our country’s economy. . . . It would so shake
confidence in public investment, it would make it harder for any
state to sell bonds.”22 The fear that state bankruptcy would
trigger crippling bond market contagion has been one of the most
widely credited arguments against state bankruptcy.23
The first thing to note is that no one claims that the
enactment of a state bankruptcy law, or even an actual
bankruptcy filing by a state, would bring systemically important
banks or other holders of state bonds crashing down.24 Think
back to the 2008 crisis. When giant financial institutions like
AIG and Citigroup were tottering, regulators feared that a
default could cripple their creditors—that AIG’s failure would
destabilize Goldman Sachs, for instance, because AIG’s
obligations to Goldman were so great. This effect, which is
sometimes called “counterparty contagion,”25 is not present in the
state context because systemically fragile institutions are not the
major holders of state bonds. The principal holders are mutual
funds and wealthy individuals who are residents of the particular
state.26
Rather than the collapse of a state’s creditors, contagionists
focus on the implications of bankruptcy for other states’ access to
the bond markets.27 According to this argument, a bankruptcy
filing by one state would cause rates to rise for other states
through a fear that the same could happen there. But if bond
markets are capable of distinguishing between fiscally troubled
states and their more stable peers, the claim that state
bankruptcy legislation would torpedo the bond markets seems
far-fetched. Before the New York City crisis of the mid-1970s,
there was indeed evidence the municipal bond markets were so
22. Matt Miller, The World Wonders: Can States Go Bankrupt?, DEAL MAG., Feb.
18, 2001, at 30, 34 (quoting Illinois House majority leader Barbara Flynn Currie).
23. See Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 918 (2012) (noting that fear of bond market contagion is “used to
justify extraordinary transfers, or bailouts, at the international level”).
24. As discussed below, the financial distress of the U.S. states stands in striking
contrast to the European crisis in this regard. In Europe, concerns about the effect of a
restructuring on systemically important banks have been a major factor in the crisis
response. See infra Part VI.
25. See, e.g., Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk,
REGULATION, Summer 2009, at 24, 24.
26. See, e.g., DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT
MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES
MARKET
12–13
(2012),
available
at
ON
THE
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf (observing that individuals
and mutual funds are the largest investors in municipal bonds); Skeel, States of
Bankruptcy, supra note 17, at 725.
27. See Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 17, at 683–84, 717.
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opaque that trouble in a major municipality could have
nationwide effects.28 State and municipal bond markets are still
less transparent than one might like, but they appear to
distinguish fairly effectively between troubled and less troubled
states. Bond yields in California and Illinois have been
consistently higher than the yields in less profligate states like
29
Iowa or North Carolina, a trend very much in evidence today.
It is possible that the enactment of state bankruptcy would
slightly increase the cost of bonds even in well-run states, either
because the bankruptcy option reduced the likelihood of federal
bailouts or because, by making restructuring easier, this option
increased the likelihood that any given state would fail to pay its
obligations in full. The first possibility is grounds more for
applause than concern because it suggests that bond prices
currently are distorted by the prospect of a federal bailout. The
possibility that bond costs might increase because bankruptcy
would increase, at least a little, the overall likelihood of a failure
to pay in full (even in well run states) is more problematic, but
also less likely. Although the risk of nonpayment may rise
slightly, the existence of an orderly restructuring mechanism can
make bondholders better rather than worse off under some
circumstances.30 Moreover, even if bankruptcy did not increase
the value of all bonds, it might increase the value of bonds in
well-run states because they are less likely to default and do not
benefit from any bailout subsidy. It is hard to know what the net
effect of these forces would be. But it is very unlikely that simply
enacting a state bankruptcy law would dramatically alter bond
prices. Perhaps the best evidence for the law’s potential effect is
municipal bankruptcy law, which did not at its origin and has not
subsequently caused crippling increases in municipal bond costs.
B. Singling Out Public Union Employees
A second answer to the “why not bankruptcy” question is
that state bankruptcy seems designed to cripple public employee

28. See David L. Hoffland, The “New York City Effect” in the Municipal Bond
Market, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar./Apr. 1977, at 36, 36–37.
29. The spread above a triple A benchmark municipal bond was 18 basis points for
Iowa and 2 for North Carolina in summer 2012, as compared to 66 for California and 157
for Illinois. Andrew Bary, State of the States, BARRON’S, Aug. 27, 2012, at 23, 24.
30. The classic study is Randall Kroszner’s analysis of the New Deal era Gold
Clause cases. Randall S. Kroszner, Is It Better to Forgive than to Receive? Repudiation of
the Gold Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression (Oct. 1998)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/finance/papers/
repudiation11.pdf.
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unions.31 Proponents of state bankruptcy have fueled this
thinking. Jeb Bush and Newt Gingrich speculated that state
bankruptcy would prompt a proposition fight over public
employee unions in California. The proposition they had in mind
“would trigger the cancellation of all state government employee
union contracts. Even if the proposition were defeated,” they
wrote, “the debate surrounding it would make abundantly clear
to the people of California and the rest of the country just how
much of a stranglehold government employee unions have on
state and federal budgets.”32
If state bankruptcy were enacted and a state did in fact file,
public employee compensation and pensions almost certainly would
be subject to restructuring, as critics fear. The bankruptcy of a state
would resemble the bankruptcy of an airline or car company in this
regard. In both contexts, the need to address labor costs is central.
While states have considerable leeway to rework collective
bargaining obligations even without bankruptcy, as controversial
reforms in Wisconsin and somewhat less controversial reforms in
New York and Connecticut have shown, bankruptcy would enhance
a state’s restructuring options, especially with respect to pensions,
as we shall see.
Although public employee contracts almost certainly would be
subject to restructuring, state bankruptcy proponents’ glee in
pointing this out and the predictable outrage of opponents have
obscured a surprising benefit of bankruptcy: the sacrifice would
almost certainly be distributed more fairly and broadly in
bankruptcy, not less. In the absence of bankruptcy, budget cutting
sacrifice has been borne almost entirely by two constituencies:
33
public employees and the recipients of public services.
Bankruptcy’s “equality of creditors” norm, which requires that

31. Relatedly, some criticize bankruptcy as making a political choice in favor of
spending cuts, and against tax increases, as a solution to states’ financial distress. See
Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1399, 1450 (2012) (“[A] state bankruptcy regime would be used as a partisan political
device to balance state budgets through cuts to employees’ compensation, services, and
benefits, and through service cuts, but not through tax increases.”). But a bankruptcy
judge can refuse to confirm a reorganization plan that eschews tax increases if the plan
does not adequately address a debtor’s financial distress. In the municipal bankruptcy
context, Clay Gillette has argued that bankruptcy judges should be given the authority to
directly impose tax increases. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will,
and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 295 (2012).
32. Bush & Gingrich, supra note 7.
33. See Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget
Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 1–4
(Feb.
9,
2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf (discussing the impact of state budget cuts on
families receiving public services and their cumulative effect upon public employees).
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similarly situated creditors receive generally similar treatment,34
would make it much more likely that other constituencies would
share the burden. In the recent Vallejo bankruptcy, for instance, the
court held that the city could restructure its collective bargaining
agreement but only if other constituencies also were contributing to
the restructuring. “While this Court recognizes that contract
rejection may have a significant adverse effect on [union]
employees,” the district court said in upholding the bankruptcy
court’s determination, the complaining union “is not being singled
out and all constituencies have or will suffer severe cuts in
Vallejo.”35
Bankruptcy does not assure that the distribution of sacrifice
36
will be perfectly equal, but equality is a core principle. If we
scratch behind one of the principal objections to bankruptcy, we find
a surprising benefit instead.
C. Bankruptcy Can’t Solve Political Problems
Although the first two responses to the “why not
bankruptcy” question have dominated public discussion, and
each is backed by a powerful political constituency, they are quite
unpersuasive on inspection. The remaining three responses have
not received as much attention but are more compelling.
Perhaps the most important response is that states’
problems are more political than fiscal, and bankruptcy is
poorly designed to solve political problems. “The U.S. fiscal
federalism arrangement means that economic downturns place

34. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 859–68 (1982) (noting that similarly situated
creditors are typically treated as equivalently as possible).
35. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo),
432 B.R. 262, 275 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
36. In his commentary on this Essay, Professor Gillette notes that Rhode Island
passed legislation purporting to give bondholders a lien on tax revenues shortly before
Central Falls filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its ByProducts: A Comment on Skeel, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1127, 1137–38 (2013). The legislation
does illustrate the possibility that favored creditors will be protected. But it is not
altogether clear that the lien would be enforced by a court, as it is quite unusual in form
and might be invalidated as an artificial lien under 11 U.S.C. § 545. In her commentary,
Professor Gelpern raises a similar issue. She asks whether the omission from Chapter 9 of
Chapter 11’s special protections for labor contracts and pensions should “be read as a sign
of bankruptcy’s ‘capture’ by capital at the expense of labor” and concludes that both
bankruptcy and informal restructuring processes may be subject to capture. Anna
Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095, 1115–16
(2013). Although I agree that there is a possibility of capture in both contexts, I suspect
that the omission of Chapter 11’s protections was an accident rather than a calculated
decision, and sacrifice seems to me to be much more broadly distributed in the bankruptcy
context than with more piecemeal approaches in the absence of bankruptcy.

Do Not Delete

1072

4/7/2013 2:19 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:4

unusual financial strains on the states,” according to one critic
of state bankruptcy, “which may be exacerbated by political
agency problems—elected official[s] pursuing private benefits,
including reelection, rather than the public interest.”37 “Rather
than addressing the causes of state budget crises,” he
contends, “proposals for state bankruptcy dangle the false hope
38
of fiscal solutions to political crises.” As a result, state
bankruptcy law might invite serial bankruptcy filings without
addressing a state’s real problems.39
There clearly is an element of truth to this concern.
However broad the bankruptcy powers may be, the capacity of
Congress or a bankruptcy judge to restructure a state’s
governmental operations is limited. Bankruptcy cannot
displace state officials or dictate state governmental policy.
But this does not mean that bankruptcy would have no effect.
Even if the bankruptcy process cannot solve a political crisis,
the enactment of a state bankruptcy law could help counteract
several key structural problems in state finance.
One obvious political dysfunction is the tendency to overrely on borrowed funds. Borrowing enables politicians to spend
the money in the short term—often on a popular project—
while deferring the costs to the future. If bankruptcy increases
the likelihood that a state will restructure its obligations and
decreases the likelihood of a federal bailout in the event of
severe financial distress, as I believe it would, it could
counteract politicians’ short-term incentives on the margin.
Debt financing would be marginally more costly, which would
discourage its use, particularly as a state’s fortunes declined.40
The effect on perverse pension politics could be even more
powerful. A major reason for states’ enormous unfunded
37. Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE, supra note 17, at 214, 214. This is Levitin’s principal critique of state
bankruptcy.
38. Id. at 216.
39. A related political objection suggests that the same political stalemates that
prevent states from solving their problems outside of bankruptcy could interfere with a
bankruptcy solution. See Richard M. Hynes, State Default and Synthetic Bankruptcy, 87
WASH. L. REV. 657, 698 (2012). This is in some respects a more compelling objection, but it
too does not warrant forgoing bankruptcy. Three reasons: bankruptcy can itself alter the
political dynamic (it may be harder to resist change after a state has filed for bankruptcy
than before, for instance); bankruptcy offers tools that are not available outside of
bankruptcy; and the possibility that bankruptcy might not always solve the state’s
problems is not a good reason to forgo bankruptcy.
40. It is possible that states would simply continue to borrow, despite the added cost
of debt, and thus that the increased cost could increase a state’s debtload overall. But it
seems more likely that the cost would chill borrowing. Indeed, a profligate state might
find it hard to borrow at acceptable prices.
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pensions is that the pensions are negotiated by state officials,
who are themselves often dependent on the votes of the same
employees whose pensions they are negotiating.41 As a result,
state officials are much less likely to drive a hard bargain than
private employers. In addition, because the funding rules that
ERISA imposes on private pensions do not apply to state
governments, pension promises can be made today but do not
have to be paid for until later. Unless taxpayers are unusually
vigilant, this dynamic often leads to excessively generous
pension promises.42
Still another factor further magnifies the problem:
balanced-budget requirements. All but one state impose some
form of requirement that state lawmakers balance the budget
43
each year. Underfunded pensions do not count in the budget
calculations, which puts great pressure on state politicians to
cheat on their pension contributions.44 At the same time as
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie pursued cuts in public
employee salaries and benefits, for instance, he deferred
making contributions to their pensions.45
Outside of bankruptcy, states have very little flexibility to
restructure the pension promises they have made to existing
and retired employees, no matter how unrealistic those
promises might be. In a state bankruptcy regime, by contrast,
unrealistic pensions that are not fully funded probably could

41. See Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365,
372–76 (2011) (discussing public pension plans and funding methods); see also Daniel DiSalvo,
The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFF., Fall 2010, at 3, 4, 10 (discussing the
“hundreds of billions of dollars in unfunded pension liabilities . . . weighing down state and city
budgets” and addressing the political clout union members have over legislative negotiations).
42. See, e.g., DiSalvo, supra note 41, at 17 (noting that public-sector unions can influence
“public policy in directions that neither elected officials nor voters desire”); Willie Brown,
Homeland Security Chief Takes Responsibility, SFGATE (Jan. 3, 2010, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/williesworld/article/Homeland-security-chief-takesresponsibility-3276937.php (“[W]e politicians, pushed by our friends in labor, gradually
expanded pay and benefits to private-sector levels while keeping the job protections and
layering on incredibly generous retirement packages that pay ex-workers almost as much as
current workers.”).
43. For an overview of state balanced-budget requirements, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf.
44.
See Joshua Rauh, The Pension Bomb, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter
2011, at 26, 28 (discussing how government accounting procedures “allow pension
plan managers to claim that a pension is fully funded as long as the expected returns
on the assets in the pension fund’s portfolio would be adequate to meet the pension
obligations”).
45.
Lisa Fleisher, N.J. Deal Could Save Billions, W ALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, at
A19.
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be restructured. Bankruptcy would protect an employee’s
pension to the extent of the funding set aside for it, just as it
protects an ordinary secured creditor’s collateral, but the
underfunded portion of a pension would be subject to
restructuring.46
The implications of this possibility for the perverse politics of
state pensions should be obvious. Even if it is unlikely that a state
would file for bankruptcy, the representatives of public employees
would have far more reason to care not just about the size of the
pensions, but also about their funding. Similarly, a decision to defer
pension contributions would be seen for what it is—as potentially
jeopardizing the pensions. Once again, the enactment of a state
bankruptcy framework would not solve the distortions in state
politics, but it would provide a welcome countervailing force.
As surprising as this may sound, state bankruptcy would be
quite similar to personal bankruptcy in this regard. Like states,
consumer debtors tend to overemphasize the short-term benefits of
borrowing and to underestimate the long-term costs. Bankruptcy
cannot fix these problems; unlike with a corporation, whose
managers can be ousted, a bankruptcy judge cannot force a
consumer to make better decisions. But it can help them to
restructure debt if it becomes completely unsustainable and give
the debtor’s creditors an incentive to monitor her decisionmaking.
Because bankruptcy cannot by itself transform state political
dysfunction, some critics worry that a profligate state might
repeatedly file for bankruptcy if that option were available,
embarking on a cycle of excessive borrowing followed by
47
bankruptcy. Once again, consumer bankruptcy provides a useful
analogy. To discourage consumers from abusing bankruptcy,
current bankruptcy law prohibits them from taking advantage of
48
the bankruptcy discharge for eight years after a prior discharge.
Although serial filing by states seems unlikely, putting a waiting
period in place, as with consumer bankruptcy, would be a far better
response to these concerns than forgoing the benefits of state
bankruptcy.

46.
Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 17, at 697–99.
47.
Levitin, supra note 31, at 1446 (“Nothing prevents states from being serial
bankruptcy filers . . . .”).
48.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006). The time periods are shorter if the debtor files
for Chapter 13, which requires a three-to-five year repayment plan, than in Chapter
7, which gives the debtor an immediate discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2006).
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D. A State’s Capital Structure Is a Small Fraction of its
Obligations
A fourth response is that a state’s capital structure is only a
small portion of the life of the state.49 Even the most heavily
indebted states devote only a small portion of their income to
serving their bond obligations: Illinois devotes about 9.6% of its
revenues to debt service and California devotes 5.3%.50 The
contrast to an ordinary corporate debtor (or to Greece or Italy),
which is likely to use much more of its income to service debt and
other obligations, is quite striking. In addition, many of a state’s
expenditures could not realistically be adjusted in bankruptcy,
such as a state’s Medicaid obligations. And large numbers of a
state’s stakeholders are not creditors; they have nonfinancial
interests at stake.51 Perhaps bankruptcy is a poor fit for a
struggling state.
This objection seems to me to make the same category
mistake as the previous response: it assumes that a formal
resolution mechanism would be ill advised unless state
bankruptcy looks like corporate bankruptcy. But personal
bankruptcy provides a more revealing comparison. Like states,
and unlike corporations, ordinary consumers have a wide range
of nonfinancial interests. Creditors are only one of many groups
of “stakeholders” in their lives. Most consumers devote the vast
majority of their earnings to activities that have no discernible
profit-making motive. Yet few would question the value of having
bankruptcy laws in place for financially troubled consumers.
Consumer bankruptcy law is based on the conclusion that
providing relief from an overwhelming debt burden is in the best
interest not just of the consumer, but of her creditors as well.
Excessive debt can discourage the consumer from taking steps to
address her financial travails and interfere with her pursuit of
potential solutions. A similar logic applies to states. A state has
more options for addressing its financial woes than a consumer.
It can cut back on services and other expenses and has a wide
range of taxing options. But if there is even a small possibility
that a state may be overwhelmed by debt, the case for having a

49.
See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 23, at 907 (“[C]ontracts in general and debt
contracts in particular define only a sliver of any state’s constituents . . . .”).
50. STATE OF ILL. COMPTROLLER, BONDED INDEBTEDNESS AND LONG TERM
OBLIGATIONS 8, 13 (2011), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/
66F97DE1-1CC1-DE6E-2F48D999108D050C/showMeta/0/
(reporting
debt
service
payments of $3.26 billion and general fund revenue of $33.8 billion); Hynes, supra note
39, at 658 n.3.
51. Gelpern, supra note 23, at 907.
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formal restructuring mechanism in place is strong. Moreover,
much as a consumer’s financial distress may impose costs on
third parties such as relatives and friends, a state’s excessive
debt imposes costs on future taxpayers.52
In the current environment, many states’ balance sheets
dramatically understate the extent of their liabilities. Although
bond debt is relatively small as a percentage of state GDP, many
states’ obligations to public employees are considerable, and they
53
have vast unfunded pension liabilities. The problem, as Paul
Volcker and Richard Ravitch put it in a recent report, is not
simply cyclical; it is structural.54 It may be that any potential
crisis is still a few years off, given that states currently are
capable of paying their pension obligations. But it would be a
mistake to assume that there is no need to have a restructuring
framework in place.
E. The Strategic Dimensions of Fiscal Federalism
A final pair of responses points to the relationship between
the federal government and the states as a basis for eschewing a
formal restructuring mechanism. According to the first, states
might use the bankruptcy option strategically, as a way to
extract a bailout with few strings attached from the federal
government.55 The second argues that state and federal finances
56
are so closely intertwined that federal bailouts are inevitable.
While the first is a legitimate concern, the logic of the second
strikes me as backwards.57
The concern that states might use the prospect of
bankruptcy to negotiate a few-strings-attached bailout begins
52. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
243–44 (1986) (discussing externalities as a justification for bankruptcy discharge for
consumer debtors).
53. See RICHARD RAVITCH ET AL., REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE
2, 3 (2012) (“Unfunded liabilities for health care benefits for state and local government
retirees amount to more than $1 trillion.”).
54. Id. at 4.
55. See Gillette, supra note 31, at 285–86, 320–22.
56. See Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 863–65,
877–78 (2012).
57. In his commentary on this Essay, Professor Gillette introduces another set of
strategic considerations, arguing that the states might respond to the existence of a state
bankruptcy framework by relying more heavily on secured obligations such as revenue
bonds. Gillette, supra note 36, at 1137. Professor Gillette’s emphasis on this and other
possible ex ante effects throughout his commentary strikes me as quite important, but
states already have a strong incentive to use similar strategies to evade balanced budget
requirements. As a result, it seems unlikely that state bankruptcy would prompt a
significant shift in state financing techniques. And even if it did, it is not clear the shift
would be pernicious.
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with a counterintuitive but plausible assumption: because state
bankruptcy cannot interfere with the state’s governmental
functions, state officials might prefer bankruptcy as compared to
a federal bailout under some circumstances—in particular, if the
bailout came with tough strings attached. If the federal
government tries to attach tough conditions to a bailout, the
state can threaten to file for bankruptcy. From the federal
government’s perspective, this threat might have little bite if
only the state itself would feel the effects of its bankruptcy. But if
the federal government is concerned about potential spillover
effects—that California’s bankruptcy filing could jolt the markets
nationwide—state officials may have the upper hand in a game of
chicken with the federal government. Under these circumstances,
the state could credibly threaten to file for bankruptcy unless the
federal government offered a bailout on attractive terms. The
existence of a state bankruptcy option could thus lead to a
weaker bailout—that is, a bailout that did not require the state
to make serious fiscal reforms—than the federal government
could achieve if there were no bankruptcy alternative lurking in
the background.
The best evidence for this line of reasoning comes from the
municipal bankruptcy context. Nearly half of the states do not
authorize their cities to file for bankruptcy, and states that do
authorize bankruptcy have sometimes tried to discourage a
municipality from filing or have imposed significant
preconditions. The state of Alabama discouraged Jefferson
County’s recent bankruptcy filing, for instance.58 Michigan does
not permit a municipality to file for bankruptcy until after the
state has first intervened and appointed an emergency manager,
59
a process Detroit is facing now. These states’ reluctance to allow
bankruptcy filings, and willingness in some cases to provide
financial support if a municipality foregoes bankruptcy, seems to
suggest that the existence of a bankruptcy option gives
municipalities leverage against the state.
Although strategic considerations like these may sometimes
come into play, in my view they do not call state bankruptcy into
serious question. Although a significant number of states forbid
their municipalities from filing for bankruptcy, many others do
not. California, the site of a growing number of important filings,
places only minor limits on municipalities’ right to file and did
58. See Mary Williams Walsh & Campbell Robertson, Just Before Deadline, County
in Alabama Delays Bankruptcy Move, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at B1.
59. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation
in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 586–89 (2012).
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not offer sweetheart bailouts to dissuade Stockton or San
Bernardino from filing. Clearly, the existence of a bankruptcy
option does not always give municipalities the strategic upper
hand.
Moreover, the absence of a state bankruptcy option does not
prevent states from playing chicken with the federal government.
The state can threaten simply to default on its obligations unless
the federal government agrees to provide rescue funding. A
state’s threat is more credible than a similar threat by a
municipality to its state because the federal government has
considerably less control over states than the states do over their
municipalities. The federal government could not threaten to
dissolve a state or give a federal official control over the state’s
contracts and budget, as states have done with their
municipalities. Because states are not creatures of the federal
government, as cities are of their state, the federal government
would have fewer options if a state carried through on its threat
to default.
Finally, if a state needed short-term funding or loan
guarantees to finance its restructuring process, this funding
might well need to come from the federal government.60 The
government could attach strings to this funding, much as socalled DIP financers do in ordinary cases and the International
Monetary Fund does as a condition of its lending. The potential
need for funding would strengthen the federal government’s
hand in any negotiations with the state, weakening the state’s
threat to file for bankruptcy unless it received a few-stringsattached bailout. Overall, a bankruptcy option seems likely to
significantly reduce the pressure for a massive federal bailout in
the event of dire financial distress.
The other federalism-based response concedes that a
bankruptcy option would diminish the likelihood of a federal
rescue but questions the wisdom of discouraging bailouts.
“Intergovernmental transfers and direct federal outlays to state
and local governments and to state and local residents are the
norm in our federalism,” as one commentator puts it. “Those
transfers are so significant as to make the worry about a one61
time bailout seem odd.” To the extent this reasoning suggests
that the greater the fiscal interdependence of federal and state
governments, the less need to worry about the states’ access to
60. Given states’ access to tax and other revenues, they might not need additional
financing in a state bankruptcy, and if they did need financing, it would likely be
substantially less than the cost of a bailout.
61. Schragger, supra note 56, at 877.
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bailouts, it seems to have the logic backwards. Closer fiscal ties
imply a greater need to worry about bailouts and to impose clear
constraints on federal funding, at least as American fiscal
federalism has historically been configured.
To appreciate this point, it is useful to distinguish between
hierarchical and market approaches to federalism. In a
hierarchical system, the higher-level government directly and
pervasively controls the expenditures of the lower-level
governments, whereas lower-level governments have more
independence in a market-based system.62 The worst possible
federalism strategy is one that does not rely either on markets or
hierarchy to constrain fiscal decisionmaking at the subnational
level. If the national government is ultimately responsible for
most or all services, the government’s insistence that it will not
step in with a bailout if a negative shock occurs is not credible.
Unless the national government closely controls state level
borrowing—that is, unless it adopts a hierarchical approach—it
is asking for trouble. If they and their creditors know that the
higher-level government will be compelled to provide rescue
financing in a crisis, states will have an incentive to over-borrow.
If states retain substantial independence, on the other hand,
under a more market-based approach, the national government
can more credibly commit to stand on the sidelines if the state
experiences fiscal distress. Markets provide the discipline that
comes from strict rules in a hierarchical approach.
Historically, the United States has relied on the market
model, in which the federal government commits not to bail out
troubled states. The assumption by the federal government of a
larger role in American life and the intertwining of federal and
state finance, however, has put increasing strain on this
approach. If the states were to conclude from this that Congress
has no choice but to bail them out if they threaten to collapse, the
results could be disastrous, as it was in Argentina and Brazil in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.63
In theory, the United States could head off these concerns by
moving to a more hierarchical approach in which Congress put
constraints on state borrowing, while conceding that it would bail
out the states if their finances were amiss. But this would
62. Here and in the discussion that follows, I draw on important recent work by
Jonathan Rodden. See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 17, at 123, 129.
63. “The central government could not prevent [the provinces in Argentina and the
states in Brazil] from continuing to undertake new borrowing and debt rollovers in the
face of very precarious fiscal positions while explicitly waiting for federal bailouts.” Id. at
129.
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require a radical shift from traditional U.S. conceptions of state
sovereignty and would face major constitutional obstacles. It is
far more plausible to assume that U.S. federalism will remain
within some version of the market model. If I am correct about
this, it suggests that lawmakers need to be more concerned about
the effects of a potential federal bailout as the links between
Congress and the states increase, not less. The key question is
whether enacting a state bankruptcy framework would reduce
the pressure for Congress to step in with a federal bailout.64 In
my view, it would.
Similar reasoning applies to arguments that bankruptcy is
unnecessary because the states can muddle through their
difficulties, in part because it is very difficult for creditors to
recover from a recalcitrant state. But the pressure for a federal
bailout is much greater if states are left to muddle through, and
the drag on growth from financial distress that lingers over a
65
long period of time may be considerable.
III. THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF MUNICIPAL DISTRESS
When the debate over state bankruptcy began, the
conventional wisdom about Chapter 9 was that real
municipalities never used it. There were far fewer filings under
Chapter 9—roughly 650 since the 1930s—than under any other
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, and the vast majority of these
involved water or sewer districts, together with a few small
66
towns. The past few years have seen a drumbeat of significant
Chapter 9 filings: Jefferson County, Alabama; Central Falls,
Rhode Island; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (a short-lived filing);
67
Stockton, California; and San Bernardino, California. During
64. Although some criticize bankruptcy for interfering with democracy, see, for
example, Schragger, supra note 56, at 883 (criticizing the proposal for state bankruptcy as
reflecting “distrust of local, representative democracy”), the criticism seems misplaced for
two reasons. First, a bailout with strings attached may intrude more deeply on local
decisionmaking than bankruptcy. Second, bankruptcy can reinvigorate democracy in
some contexts, as would likely be the effect with pensions, as noted earlier. See supra Part
II.C.
65. Analogizing to a famous study of an Israeli daycare center, Professor Gillette
suggests that a state might be too tempted to default on their obligations if they had a
bankruptcy option. Gillette, supra note 36, at 1143. This is possible, but it seems much
more likely that states would be very reluctant to invoke a bankruptcy option.
Bankruptcy would have much greater consequences for a state’s governor or other
decisionmaker than the decision whether to pay a small fine for picking up one’s child late
from daycare.
66. See generally Kimhi, supra note 9, at 357, 359 n.43 (discussing paucity of
Chapter 9 filings, especially for general-purpose municipalities).
67. Michael Corkery, Muni Blues Worry Investors: Growing Fear That Cities Will
Default—Not Out of Necessity but as a Strategy, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2012, at C1.
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this same period, Michigan, Pennsylvania and several other
states have passed legislation tightening their control over
financially troubled municipalities. These two developments
reflect starkly different—yet consistent—strategies for resolving
municipalities’ financial distress.
Start with the second development: states’ tightening of
control over financially troubled municipalities. As originally
enacted in 2011, the Michigan legislation instructed the “state
financial authority,” which for a municipality is the state
treasurer, to conduct a preliminary review of any city or other
local government that shows symptoms of “municipal financial
stress.”68 If the treasurer’s review concludes that severe financial
distress exists, and the Governor reaches the same conclusion,
the Governor is required to declare that the city is in
69
receivership. The Governor must then appoint an emergency
70
manager. The emergency manager displaces the city’s governing
body and other decisionmakers, and he or she has forty-five days
71
to create a written financial and operating plan for the city. As
part of this plan, the emergency manager can reject, modify, or
terminate city contracts, including its collective bargaining
72
agreements.
Although the Michigan approach is a substitute for
bankruptcy, it takes a very different form than Chapter 9.
Whereas Chapter 9 is patterned on ordinary bankruptcy and
assumes that the municipality’s existing decisionmakers will
remain in place, the Michigan framework temporarily displaces
the municipality’s governing body. Not surprisingly, local critics
challenged the Michigan reforms as a usurpation of local
democracy. In the terms I used at the end of the last Part,
Michigan’s stance toward its municipalities still is consistent
with a market approach, but by authorizing draconian

68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1512(1)(r) (West Supp. 2012). The Michigan
provisions were repealed by voters in November, 2012 and subsequently replaced by
provisions that give a troubled municipality a choice between an emergency manager and
several other options, but are generally similar to the original provisions. Pennsylvania
amended its municipal oversight legislation to prevent Harrisburg from filing for
bankruptcy for at least a year. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY
&
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
STATES
3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Municipal%20Bankruptcy%20%26%20the%20
Role%20of%20the%20States.pdf.
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1515(4) (West Supp. 2012).
70. Id.
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.1517–.1518 (West Supp. 2012) (listing the
powers and responsibilities of the emergency manager).
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1519(1)(j)–(k) (West Supp. 2012) (giving the
emergency manager the power to rework or extinguish existing contracts).
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intervention into the affairs of a tottering municipality, the state
has taken a large step toward hierarchy.
The recent municipal bankruptcies have, in a sense, pushed
in the opposite direction, extending the existing market-oriented
approach in two respects. First, they have signaled that Chapter
9 is indeed an option—and an alternative to rescue financing.
The conventional wisdom that significant municipalities do not
file for Chapter 9 is no longer accurate. As Warren Buffett has
put it, the stigma is disappearing.73
Second, the scope of restructuring has expanded
considerably. Before Vallejo filed for bankruptcy, there were
significant questions as to whether a Chapter 9 debtor could
terminate its collective bargaining agreements. Vallejo answered
that question in the affirmative, and the city also adjusted the
74
terms of its bond debt. The only major obligation that Vallejo
did not touch was its underfunded pension obligations to its
retirees. Vallejo seemed to confirm that pensions cannot be
adjusted in bankruptcy. But the bankruptcy of Central Falls,
Rhode Island, has offered a very different perspective. Central
Falls’ reorganization plan will effect a major restructuring of its
pensions.75 Because the city’s retirees agreed to the restructuring,
the Central Falls case did not test the legal objections to
restructuring pensions, but it showed that political opposition to
pension adjustments is not insurmountable. Given that
underfunded pensions lie at the heart of many municipalities’
(and states’) financial crises, the legal question of whether the
pensions of retirees can be adjusted over their objection may well
be addressed soon. There is a strong argument, as I have
contended elsewhere, that pensions are entitled to protection to
the extent they have been funded, but that the unfunded portion
can be restructured in bankruptcy.76
For addressing municipalities’ financial distress, fiscal control
boards and Chapter 9 approaches have different virtues and
limitations. Assuming Michigan’s emergency manager approach
withstands judicial scrutiny, it can more directly address a
municipality’s political problems than Chapter 9.77 Yet the scope of
73. Margaret Collins, Buffett Says Muni Bankruptcies Set to Climb as Stigma Lifts,
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13/buffett-saysmuni-bankruptcies-poised-to-climb-as-stigma-lifts.html.
74. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo),
432 B.R. 262, 270, 274–75 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
75. In re City of Central Falls, No. 11-13105, 2011 WL 4396953, at *9–13 (Bankr.
D.R.I. Sept. 22, 2011).
76. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 17, at 692.
77. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Control Boards and Municipal Fiscal Crises 4, 6,
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possible restructuring is likely to be constrained. Whether an
emergency manager can restructure a collective bargaining
agreement, as authorized by the statute, is not altogether certain
because the Contracts Clause prohibits states from altering
contracts.78 Even if the emergency manager can indeed alter some
contracts if a municipality is in crisis, she almost certainly could not
be authorized to restructure the municipality’s pensions. In Chapter
9, by contrast, the existing decisionmakers retain control, but they
probably can restructure a broader range of obligations.79
It seems unlikely that other states will rush to emulate
Michigan’s emergency manager statute, because the Michigan
statute owes its existence to a particular confluence of factors: deep
crises in a number of municipalities and Republican control of the
Governor’s mansion and the legislature. Even under these
conditions, the statute has been controversial. In more ordinary
circumstances, the centralization of authority would prove
impossible in most states. Moreover, a permanent shift toward
centralization would sacrifice the well-known benefits of local
control.
In practice, fiscal control boards may diffuse any hold-up power
that a city might otherwise have as a result of the bankruptcy
option.80 From this perspective, it is interesting to note that states
generally have not withdrawn the Chapter 9 option when they
enacted or revised their fiscal-control-board provisions. Fiscal
control boards have supplemented rather than substituted for
Chapter 9.
The implications of these developments for the financial
distress of states are unclear. Given the constraints of state

12 (Apr. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the broad powers of emergency
managers to “advise on, regulate, and frequently direct the fiscal affairs of distressed
localities” despite a lack of political experience or aspiration), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloqui
a__law_economics_and_politics_of_urban_affairs/documents/documents/ecm_pro_072354.
pdf. Gillette suggests that fiscal control boards can be justified if they address problems in
local interest group politics or limit contagion risks, but he raises questions about their
efficacy in practice. Id. at 42–44.
78. The prohibition is not complete. The Supreme Court has long permitted some
state interference with contracts, particularly in the event of financial crisis. For a brief
discussion of the case law, see Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alternation of Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 22–25
(2011).
79. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 41, at 383–84.
80. Although the risk of contagion seems limited even here, it is possible that a
city’s bankruptcy filing would have spillover effects for other municipalities in the state
(and thus give the troubled city a certain amount of holdup power) to the extent state
policies are a contributing factor because other municipalities also will be subject to these
policies.

Do Not Delete

1084

4/7/2013 2:19 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:4

sovereignty, the fiscal-control-board approach may not be a
realistic option for troubled states. For state financial distress,
the key lesson will come from the new Chapter 9 filings: if
Chapter 9 appears to work relatively well, the new cases will
underscore the case for giving states a similar option. An
important question here is whether at least some municipalities
succeed in restructuring their pensions along with other
obligations.
Let me suggest a best-case scenario in this regard. In the
recent bankruptcy of Stockton, California, several bondholders
responded to the city manager’s suggestion that he does not plan
to touch Stockton’s pensions by filing a motion aimed at forcing
Stockton to reconsider this stance.81 If the bankruptcy judge
signals that he will take the extent to which sacrifice is evenly
distributed into account when he rules on any proposed
reorganization plan, and Stockton makes at least some
adjustments to its pensions, the Stockton case could show that
Chapter 9 has come of age and could serve as evidence of the
potential benefits of state bankruptcy.
It is too soon to know whether Stockton or one of the other
recent cases will in fact teach these lessons or whether they will
provide cautionary tales about the limits of formal restructuring
mechanisms. But they are forcing a rethinking of what
bankruptcy can and cannot do.
IV. WOULD PENSION REFORM BE SUFFICIENT?
The discussion thus far has assumed that the financial
distress of states and municipalities is sufficiently complex as to
require a comprehensive restructuring strategy, whether it be
bankruptcy or a more ad hoc measure. State and municipal
distress is indeed complex, but a major piece of the puzzle for
many of the most troubled municipalities and states is
unsustainable pension promises. (Bond debt, by contrast, is a
much smaller portion of municipal and state indebtedness, as
noted earlier.) Might pension reform alone be enough?
Certainly if states’ pension obligations suddenly disappeared
or were suddenly fully funded, their financial picture would look

81. The motion asks the bankruptcy judge to dismiss the case, due to Stockton’s
failure to negotiate with Calpers over potential pension cuts prior to bankruptcy. Similar
issues have arisen in San Bernardino’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Steven
Church & James Nash, Calpers Bankruptcy Strategy Pits Retirees vs. All Others,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-12-12/calpers-bankruptcy-strategy-pits-retirees-vs-dot-all-others#p1
(discussing
Calpers’ claim that pension obligations should be given priority treatment).
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far less bleak. According to some estimates, state pensions
currently are underfunded by more than $3 trillion.82 Not only
the size but also the nature of the problem makes a laser-like
focus on pensions attractive; like private corporations, many
states and municipalities are shifting away from traditional
defined benefit pensions.83 The defined contribution alternative
poses far less financial risk.
Although targeting pensions is attractive, it has several
considerable downsides. The first is that constitutional obstacles
likely would prevent either Congress or the states themselves
from directly restructuring states’ pension obligations to retirees
and existing state employees. Pension reform would not be
sufficiently comprehensive in scope to constitute an exercise of
Congress’s Bankruptcy Clause powers. As a result, it would
likely be construed as an impermissible interference with state
sovereignty to the extent it purported to apply to obligations that
predated the reform. Although several states have made minor
adjustments to their pension promises, the laws of most states,
together with the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, would
84
thwart any effort to alter the states’ obligations to retirees. This
suggests that any reform could only affect future obligations, not
existing ones.
The second issue is fairness. Even if federal or state
lawmakers did have the power to restructure state pensions,
targeting pensions raises serious fairness issues as compared to a
restructuring framework that distributes the sacrifice among a
broader range of constituencies, as bankruptcy ordinarily does.
One way to address at least the second of these concerns
might be to adopt a framework for protecting state pensions that
mirrored the safety net that ERISA provides for the pensions of
85
private corporations. If a corporate pension fund is terminated,
the Pension Guaranty Benefit Corporation pays retirees a
substantial portion, but not all, of the benefits they would have
82. Hynes, supra note 39, at 669; see also Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh,
Policy Options for State Pension Systems and Their Impact on Plan Liabilities, 10 J.
PENSION ECON. & FIN. 173 (2011).
83. See Steven Greenhouse, City’s Pension Cut Proposal May Set Negotiating
Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at B3; Danny Hakim & Steven Greenhouse, From
Albany, Move to Trim Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at A1.
84. For a critical analysis of this tendency, see Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as
Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 1029, 1034–35 (2012).
85. For a similar approach, albeit one that contemplates a bailout of existing
obligations, see James P. Allen, Jr. & Richard A. Bales, ERISA Failures and the Erosion
of Workers’ Rights: The Urgent Need to Protect Private & Public Workers’ Pensions and
Benefits, 75 ALB. L. REV. 449, 456–58 (2011).
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received if the fund had not failed.86 In effect, the benefits are
subject to a partial restructuring.
Although the safety net approach is in some respects a very
attractive alternative to state bankruptcy, it has several key
limitations. First, as already noted, it probably could only handle
prospective pension obligations. If federal guarantees are a
solution, they are more a solution to future problems than to
current ones. A second concern, political pressure to permit
states to continue to underfund their pensions, is both an
attraction and a limitation of federal pension guarantees.
Because federal regulators are removed from state politics, they
might be better able to resist pressure to underfund state
pensions. Yet the experience of the PGBC, which has been on the
brink of financial collapse for some time, is a cautionary tale in
this regard, suggesting that federal regulators might themselves
be subject to capture by state decisionmakers.87 Third, to the
extent defined contribution plans are a more sustainable
approach to public employee pensions, establishing federal
pension guarantees might delay a beneficial transition. Finally,
pension reform is a less comprehensive approach to states’
financial travails than state bankruptcy. Although underfunded
pensions are a huge portion of the fiscal problem, states face
other financial distresses as well, from their bond debt to
employee medical costs.
Federal pension guarantees are an intriguing alternative to
the deeply flawed current system. But bankruptcy seems a more
promising option.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
HEALTHCARE RULING
The relevance of the Michigan reforms and the recent
Chapter 9 filings to our discussion was quite obvious. The same
cannot be said about another recent development: the Supreme
Court’s ruling on the Affordable Care Act, the controversial 2010
88
healthcare legislation. But the last of the key rulings in that
case could have significant implications for Congress’s
intervention in state fiscal affairs.
86. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
87. Michael S. Greve, Speech at Boise State University: The State of Our
Federalism
(Sept.
16,
2011)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.aei.org/files/2011/09/16/State-of-Federalism-Greve.pdf) (“The bad federalism is
the one we have. . . . Cartel federalism is competitive federalism, upside-down: it
systematically suppresses healthy policy and economic competition among states.”).
88. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584, 2608 (2012).
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The marquee question in the healthcare case was whether
the mandate that every American citizen obtains health
89
insurance or pays a penalty is constitutional. Chief Justice
90
Roberts, who provided the deciding vote, said that that it is.
Although the mandate could not be justified under the Commerce
Clause, its penalty can be construed as a tax.91 The Court also
considered whether the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, which
authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
withhold any or all of a state’s existing Medicaid funding unless
the state agreed to implement the expansion, constituted an
impermissible commandeering of the state.92 Prior to National
Federation of Independent Business, the Court seemed to suggest
that nearly any program that attached strings to federal funding
would withstand constitutional challenge; the inclusion of federal
funds and invocation of Congress’s authority under the Spending
Clause, the reasoning went, would cover a multitude of sins,
insulating programs that might otherwise seem problematic to
challenge.93 A seven-justice majority of the Court cast cold water
on this perception, striking down the provision in the Act that
authorized the withholding of unrelated Medicaid funding from
states that declined to expand Medicaid coverage. “The
threatened loss of over ten percent of a State’s overall budget,”
the Chief Justice wrote, is impermissible “economic dragooning
that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the
Medicaid expansion.”94
The Court’s stiffening up of its commandeering and
Spending Clause case law raises two key questions about
Congress’s options for intervening in state financial distress. The
first is whether a rescue-financing program that attaches
significant strings might be struck down as commandeering. The
Court suggests that a central issue is whether “a State has a
legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions in
exchange for federal funds,” and that the question is whether
financial inducements constitute “relatively mild encouragement”
95
or “a gun to the head.” Federal funding for a troubled state with
conditions attached probably would be upheld even under this
standard so long as the funds and the conditions were closely

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 2577.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2593, 2600.
Id. at 2601–02.
The leading case is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 & n.2 (1987).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
Id. at 2602–04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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linked. But National Federation of Independent Business may
suggest that the Court will strike down a funding package that
intrudes too deeply into state decisionmaking.
From this perspective, a state bankruptcy framework may
stand on firmer constitutional footing than ad hoc federal
intervention with conditionalities. State bankruptcy has
independent constitutional support because the Bankruptcy
Clause explicitly authorizes Congress to make bankruptcy laws,96
and the bankruptcy process does not interfere as directly with
state decisionmaking.
But—and this is the second issue—the Court’s
commandeering discussion also hints at potential sovereignty
concerns with state bankruptcy. State sovereignty “rests on what
might at first seem a counterintuitive insight,” according to Chief
Justice Roberts, that “freedom is enhanced by the creation of two
97
98
governments, not one.” Here, as in another recent case, the
Court suggests that state sovereignty is to some extent a matter
of individual freedom, not just respect for the interests of the
state itself.99 If individual liberty is a key dimension of state
sovereignty, we cannot assume that protecting state consent and
noninterference with state decisionmaking is sufficient to assure
the constitutionality of a state (or municipal, for that matter)
bankruptcy framework. There remains the question whether
individual liberty is compromised.
It is hard to predict the implications of the Court’s state
sovereignty jurisprudence in the abstract. The Court’s
100
endorsement of municipal bankruptcy in the 1930s and the
101
broad sweep it has given to the Bankruptcy Clause suggest
that a state bankruptcy law would likely be upheld. In addition,
individual liberty concerns seem strongest when individual
rights are at stake, which is much less directly the case with
state bankruptcy than in Bond v. United States, in which the
petitioner sought to challenge her conviction and six-year
sentence
under
the
Chemical
Weapons
Convention
Implementation Act of 1998.102 But the increasing emphasis on
96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
97. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
99. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
100. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (“[B]ankruptcy power is
competent to give relief to [district] debtors in such a plight . . . .”).
101. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 45–46 (1995).
102. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
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individual liberty has added an important complication.103 If
Congress were simply playing the Supreme Court odds, and
concerned only about short-term results, the best option might be to
intervene in ad hoc fashion after an actual crisis emerges and a
state threatens to default. Even if the ad hoc approach was later
struck down as unconstitutional, it might well do its work before
the Court intervened.104 But a state bankruptcy law seems likely to
withstand constitutional attack, and it would provide a more
predictable and orderly approach to restructuring state obligations.
VI. A RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE?
During the same period as the state and municipal crisis has
unfolded in the United States, the nations of Southern Europe have
faced even direr conditions. The two crises are in many respects
closely parallel. The U.S. states and the nations of Europe are
sovereign and yet have ceded aspects of their sovereignty—they are
105
quasi-sovereigns, in Professor Gelpern’s terms. Because they do
not have their own currency, the states and European countries
cannot use devaluation to lessen the effect of their fiscal crisis.
Given that this leaves federal bailout or straight default as the most
likely outcome of a crisis, the case for adopting formal restructuring
rules seems particularly strong.106
In some respects, the case for a restructuring framework in
Europe is even more compelling than for the U.S. states, given

103. For discussion, see Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States,
in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 17, at 229, 235.
104. For an argument that the initial response to a crisis should be distinguished
from ordinary regulation, see Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 1051, 1063–64 (2009). See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance
in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1613, 1614, 1665 (2009) (arguing that the Congress will accede to the Executive in an
emergency, and that the Executive will be constrained only by popular opinion and other
“broad political processes”).
105. Gelpern, supra note 23, at 896.
106. Although she remains skeptical about sovereign bankruptcy frameworks,
Professor Gelpern notes that the bankruptcy-like elements in European instruments and
concludes that “if the European project were to succeed, I would not be surprised to see
proto-bankruptcy features emerging as a core part of the federal bargain.” Gelpern, supra
note 36, at 1126. As will become apparent below, I think she is likely to be right about
this. Our principal disagreements concern the extent to which the benefits of bankruptcy
can be achieved in sovereign contexts through contract. Professor Gelpern is more
optimistic about contract and other sources of priority and less optimistic about formal
bankruptcy. Even here, there are points of agreement. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT. L. 177, 198–
200 (2005) (arguing that the IMF could function somewhat like a debtor in possession
lender in bankruptcy, and that the priority of the loans it facilitated could be enforced by
contract-like remedies).
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the trajectory of the two crises.107 Although some U.S. states
remain in serious financial trouble, conditions have generally
improved since the outset of the crisis. “The fiscal backdrop is
better than it was three years ago,” a recent report concluded.
“State tax revenues rose for the ninth straight quarter in the first
three months of 2012 . . . .”108 Although there are glimmers of
hope in Europe as well, the long-term prognosis remains dire.
Over the past four years, European authorities have arranged
bailout packages for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, and have
109
midwifed a significant restructuring of Greece’s bond debt. All
three remain troubled, as more ominously do Spain and Italy.110
In addition to their need for financial relief, the countries’ capital
structure includes far more bond debt, which is the traditional
focus of bankruptcy-style restructuring.111 Moreover, a European
restructuring framework would not interfere with their
sovereignty appreciably more than do the current strictures
imposed by European authorities.
In one important respect, however, bankruptcy might prove
more problematic in Europe than for the U.S. states. Because
U.S. state bonds are held primarily by mutual funds and wealthy
individuals who live in the state, restructuring them would not
jeopardize the financial system. The ownership of European
bonds looks quite different. During the crisis, systemically
important European banks have held large amounts of Greek
and other sovereign debt, as have the banks of the local
112
sovereign. The risk that restructuring would have untoward
systemic effects is therefore much greater in Europe, as is the
potential for an ongoing drain on growth.113 (In each case, the

107. Anne Krueger, the original architect of the IMF’s 2002 proposal for a Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism, has advocated a similar restructuring framework for
Europe. FRANÇOIS GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
RESOLUTION: A PROPOSAL 25–34 (2010), available at http://www.bruegel.org/
publications/publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debtcrisis-resolution-a-proposal/#.URUlCo5kJ94.
108. Bary, supra note 29, at 24. Bary also notes, however, that a number of states
continue to face severe pension underfunding problems. Id. at 26.
109. Landon Thomas, Jr., In Cyprus Bailout, Questions of Whether Depositors Should
Shoulder the Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at B4.
110. Francesca Landini & Julien Toyer, IMF Urges Aid for Italy, Spain but Rome
Baulking, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2012/10/17/us-eurozone-idUSBRE89G0NO20121017.
111. Liz Alderman & Matthew Saltmarsh, Borrowing Costs Rise for Italy and Spain,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at B1; see also IULIA STANISLAV EMINESCU, STRUCTURE OF
GOVERNMENT DEBT IN EUROPE IN 2011 2 (2012).
112. Alderman & Saltmarsh, supra note 111.
113. See Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility
in Financially Integrated Economies 3, 16–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
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bondholding patterns are in part an unintended consequence of
legal regulation. Wealthy Californians buy California bonds
because they are exempt not just from federal tax but also from
California state tax. French and German banks held large
amounts of Greek debt at the outset of the crisis because the debt
of any European country, regardless how troubled, was treated
as risk free for capital purposes.)
In the United States, the relationship between the states
and the federal government is sufficiently well defined that we
can say with considerable confidence that a state bankruptcy law
could enhance states’ fiscal stability and diminish the pressure
for federal bailouts. That is, it could reinforce the market
approach to the federal-state relationship.
With Europe, nearly every dimension of the federalist
structure is still up for grabs. A common theme in many recent
discussions is the need to increase “fiscal union”—by which
commentators mean greater European control over countries’
spending decisions.114 Complete or near complete fiscal union
would amount to hierarchical control over EU members’ spending
decisions. If Europe were to consolidate in this fashion, there
would be little need for a formal restructuring framework. Along
with centralized control would come an implicit or explicit
commitment to provide European rescue financing if a member
fell into financial distress. This approach has a great deal to
commend it. A more consolidated Europe might be better able to
compete in worldwide markets. It also would reduce the
likelihood that the response to a crisis would cause system-wide
damage to the financial system.
The obvious obstacle to this approach is the deep resistance
throughout the EU membership to so fully ceding their
sovereignty to European authorities.115 The current trend appears
to be toward greater but limited fiscal consolidation, together
with a larger and more flexible bailout fund.116 The perspective I
have advocated in this Essay suggests that this is a highly risky
Paper No. 16899, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16899 (modeling effects
of a decrease in the value of government debt on lending by banks that hold the debt).
114. James Kanter & Stephen Castle, Weary of Crisis, but Wary of Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at B1; Nick Thompson, EU Leaders Talk Fiscal Union as Greeks
Protest Austerity Cuts, CNN (Oct. 18, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/business/
eu-summit.
115. Kanter & Castle, supra note 114.
116. EU officials have also debated whether to authorize euro bonds guaranteed by
the EU as a whole. This would in effect be a form of implicit bailout and has been resisted
by Germany. For a description of three recent proposals for addressing the European
crisis through euro bonds or adjustments to the bailout fund, see Landon Thomas, Jr.,
Pondering the Euro Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at B1.
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strategy, which risks landing Europe in the intermediate
territory between hierarchical and market approaches. If the EU
retains only limited control yet is responsible for bailing out
troubled countries, its members will have incentives to
circumvent EU oversight and to please local constituents at the
expense of fiscal stability. In the current crisis, the EU has
insisted on major austerity measures as a condition of rescue
funding, which in theory could signal that any bailout will
require serious reform. But it is not clear that the austerity has
been effective, which may make it harder to credibly signal that
future bailouts will come with major strings.
A more robust commitment to the market-oriented version of
federalism would require Europe to do one of two things: either
create a two-track approach to the Euro or put a formal
restructuring mechanism in place. Under a two-track Euro,
countries whose financial health deteriorated would be
temporarily moved off the Euro, which would effectively devalue
their currencies.117 Alternatively, Europe could introduce a
bankruptcy framework analogous to the one I have advocated for
the American states. Either solution could provide a credible
alternative to bailout funding in the event of a crisis.
The U.S. states have fewer options, and there is less
uncertainty about the form that American federalism will take.
Notwithstanding threats by the occasional Texan to launch a
campaign for secession, no state will be kicked off or leave the
dollar. Similarly, as tightly interlinked as federal and state
finances now are, states will retain extensive sovereignty over
their own affairs. Given these realities, together with the lower
systemic risk in the event of a restructuring, the case for a formal
restructuring framework is far less equivocal for the U.S. states
than in Europe.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities can often muddle
through their financial distress, not least because it is usually
quite difficult for their creditors to insist on repayment. If they
have other tools for addressing financial distress, such as
currency devaluation, or if a higher level of government is
committed to overseeing the entity and providing rescue funding

117. See generally Charles W. Calomiris, Exiting the Euro Crisis, in LIFE IN THE
EUROZONE WITH OR WITHOUT SOVEREIGN DEFAULT? 115, 122 (Franklin Allen et al. eds.,
2011); Breaking Up the Euro Area: How to Resign from the Club, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4,
2010, at 88, 88–89.
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if necessary, formal restructuring rules may not make sense. In a
more market-oriented framework, by contrast, as with the U.S.
states, bankruptcy can diminish the pressure for bailouts by
higher level or outside entities and brings a variety of other
benefits as well. In such a context, the case for formal
restructuring rules is especially strong.

